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 HOT SPOTS AND BLIND SPOTS: GEOGRAPHICAL
 CLUSTERS OF FIRMS AND INNOVATION
 RICHARD POUDER
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 Clemson University
 Hot spots are fast-growing geographic clusters of competing firms.
 Drawing on several literature streams, we develop an evolutionary
 model that contrasts hot spot and non-hot spot competitors within
 the same industry. Initially, economies of agglomeration, institutional
 forces, and managers' mental models create an innovative environ-
 ment within the hot spot. Over time, those same forces create a homoge-
 neous macroculture that suppresses innovation, making hot spot
 competitors more susceptible than non-hot spot competitors to environ-
 mental jolts.
 [T]raditional hot spots are turning into sewers. (Gupta, 1992: B2)
 Fast-growing, geographically clustered firms within industries-
 sometimes referred to as hot spots-have become an increasingly impor-
 tant part of the competitive landscape. As Porter observed, the geographic
 concentration of firms in the same industry is "strikingly common around
 the world" (1990: 120). For example, Business Week (1992), estimated that
 600,000 Americans were employed in 15 high-tech hot spots, and many
 new hot spots were still emerging. In the United States, a few examples
 of hot spots include the laser and electro-optics industry in Orlando, Flor-
 ida, the biotechnology and communications industries in San Diego, Cali-
 fornia, the computer manufacturing and computer chip industry in Austin,
 Texas, and the ceramics industry in Corning, New York. In Europe, hot
 spot locations include the Scientific City in France, the ceramics industry
 in Sassuolo, Italy, auto manufacturing in the Basque Region, and medical
 instruments in Tuttlingen, Germany. Because firms in hot spots play an
 increasingly important role in job creation and technological innovation,
 it is important to understand why hot spots form, how geographical cluster-
 ing affects the behavior of hot spots over time, and what the ultimate
 effect of clustering is on firms' innovation and success.
 Evidence has shown that competitors in former hot spots, such as
 Route 128 in Boston, Massachusetts (minicomputers), and the Minneapolis,
 Minnesota, area (mainframes), have experienced great declines in growth,
 accompanied by economic devastation. This rise-and-fall pattern suggests
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 that some geographically clustered groups of competitors may experience
 evolutionary phases similar to those experienced by larger industry popu-
 lations. Initially, highly innovative new entrants to a geographical cluster
 grow dramatically (Florida & Kenney, 1990), creating an identity (hot spot)
 for the clustered firms. Over time, however, failures prevail among individ-
 ual firms, and the performance of the hot spot deteriorates (Suskind, 1992).
 Indeed, the quote preceding this article vividly describes the demise of
 hot spots.
 Although researchers in industrial organization, organizational ecol-
 ogy, and economic geography have documented the tendency of groups of
 firms within industries to cluster in geographical space (Bania, Calkins, &
 Dalenberg, 1992; Lomi, 1995; Maarten de Vet & Scott, 1992; Melecki, 1985;
 Porter, 1990; Rees & Stafford, 1986; Saxenian, 1994; Scott, 1989), hot spots
 are generally an understudied phenomenon in the organization sciences
 (DeNoble & Galbraith, 1992). As Scott noted, "Indeed it may be said that
 the question of the initiation and early consolidation of growth centers in
 capitalism (from 19th century Lancashire to Henry Ford's Detroit to Silicon
 Valley) has never really been satisfactorily addressed or resolved"
 (1989: 91).
 In this article, we follow the lead of Baum and Mezias (1992: 599), who
 called for research that examines "the relationship between localized
 competition and the dynamics of organizational founding, growth, and
 transformation. Such research would help to specify more fully the signifi-
 cance of localized competitive processes for population dynamics and
 organizational evolution." In developing our research propositions about
 the behavior of clustered groups of competitors within a larger industry
 population and the effects on innovation, we drew from the following
 research streams: (a) punctuated equilibrium and innovation (Gersick,
 1991; Tushman & Romanelli, 1989), (b) organizational ecology (Aldrich &
 Fiol, 1994; Baum & Mezias, 1992; Hannan & Carroll, 1992; Hannan & Free-
 man, 1977, 1989; Lomi, 1995), (c) economic geography (Bania et al., 1992;
 Scott, 1992), (d) industrial organization and the resource-based view of the
 firm (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Porter, 1980),
 (e) institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991; Powell, 1991;
 Zucker, 1983), and (f) cognitive theories (Kielser & Sproull, 1982; Nisbett &
 Ross, 1980; Porac, Thomas, & Emme, 1987; Reger & Huff, 1993).
 In this article, we argue that a clustered subgroup of competitors
 within an industry will likely move through three evolutionary phases
 that pattern the punctuated equilibrium model: (a) origination of the cluster
 and emergence of the hot spot identity, (2) convergence of clustered firms,
 and (3) firm reorientation, which includes a decline in the performance of
 the cluster or hot spot (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). For each phase, we
 discuss the role that resource economies, cognitive frameworks, and insti-
 tutional forces play in influencing competitive behavior and levels of
 innovation. For each phase, we also show how the hot spot evolution
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 differs from the overall industry evolution captured by a typical industry
 life cycle.
 We propose that the economies of agglomeration' that initially draw
 firms together eventually erode. We also argue that the competitive strate-
 gies of firms in a given hot spot, which are initially highly innovative,
 tend to be less innovative over time because firms define their field of
 competition as the hot spot to which they belong, rather than as the total
 industry population. We propose that this restricted perspective gives rise
 to competitive "blind spots" (Porter, 1980: 59), which limit firms' innovative
 potential and adversely affect their performance.
 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
 Definitions
 According to the popular business literature discussed in the introduc-
 tion, hot spots are described as high-growth, usually technologically
 based, and geographically clustered groups of competing firms. Although
 commonly discussed in the business literature, a hot spot is a context
 that lacks formal definition in the research literature. For this article, we
 provide the following definition:
 Hot Spot: Regional clusters of firms that (a) compete in the
 same industry, (b) begin as one or several start-up firms that,
 as a group, grow more rapidly than other industry participants
 (sales and employment levels), and (c) have the same or very
 similar immobile physical resource requirements in the long
 run.2
 We argue that hot spots appear to undergo an evolutionary process,
 which may have a negative impact on innovation in the long run. In order
 to better understand this evolutionary process, we must clarify our use of
 the term innovation, which has been variously defined in the literature.
 Innovation: (a) the new products or services, new processes,
 and new organizational structures that firms use to compete
 with one another and meet customer demand; (b) the adoption
 of a new idea, process, product, or service, developed internally
 or acquired from the external environment as a function of a
 firm's technical, strategic, and administrative skills. (Nelson &
 Winter, 1982)
 ' According to Arthur (1990: 237), there are economies of agglomeration "if the net benefits
 to being in a location together with other firms increase with the number of firms in the lo-
 cation."
 2 Not all geographical clusters of competitors become hot spots as we have defined them.
 Firms that are located near one another in order to capture a local market opportunity
 would not constitute a hot spot. For example, managers of hotels, retail establishments, and
 restaurants consider the availability of customers when making location decisions, but these
 companies would not form hot spots (see Baum & Menzias, 1992; Gripsrud & Gronhaug, 1985).
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 Overview of the Theoretical Framework
 Organization innovation is subject to individual, organizational, and
 environmental influence (Damanpour, 1991). Although most research has
 been focused on the individual and organizational factors that play a key
 role in the ability of an organization to adopt innovations, the extraorgani-
 zational context, particularly the industry group, also influences innova-
 tiveness (Van de Ven, 1986). In this article, we focus on the literature that
 develops an industry-level context for the study of innovation.
 In studies of innovation from an industry perspective, Van de Ven
 and Garud (1989) defined an industry as a social system that governs,
 integrates, and performs all of the functions required to transform techno-
 logical innovations into commercially viable products. They argued that
 the social system constituting an industry emerges over time through a
 process of accumulation, and moves through stages from initiation to
 start-up. In the following sections we develop a similar dynamic view of
 geographical clusters of firms and argue that, under certain conditions,
 they will behave as a subpopulaion of a larger population and will have
 similar resources, cost structures, mental models, and competitive behav-
 ior. As a result, the geographical cluster will have different rates and
 areas of innovation compared to the larger industry population.
 We develop our model of subpopulation evolution using the organiza-
 tional evolutionary stages described in the punctuated equilibrium model
 (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) and by the idea of deep structure (Gersick,
 1991). According to punctuated equilibrium concepts, the emergence and
 evolution of an industry are characterized by alternating periods of indus-
 try cooperation and industry competition, which create patterns of industry
 convergence. The pattern of convergence is initiated by the creation of an
 organizational deep structure. For the punctuated equilibrium model, deep
 structure is defined as "a network of fundamental interdependent choices
 of the basic configuration into which a system's units are organized, and
 the activities that maintain both this configuration and the system's re-
 source exchange with the environment" (Gersick, 1991: 15). We chose the
 punctuated equilibrium model as our organizing framework because it
 highlights the interaction between a firm's behavior and an industry's
 behavior, unlike organizational life-cycle and teleological process theo-
 ries of organizational development and change (see Van de Ven & Poole,
 1995) that are focused primarily on organizational factors.
 The thesis of our model is that geographical clustering can lead to
 resource arrangements and costs, mental models, and patterns of competi-
 tive behavior that create a deep structure within the cluster. The deep
 structure causes competitors within the cluster to behave differently from
 competitors outside the cluster, to assess competitor and market trends
 differently, and, ultimately, to become vulnerable to naive industry as-
 sumptions and imitative behavior that leads to unproductive innovative
 efforts. The result is two separate evolutionary paths for clustered and
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 nonclustered competitors. Initially, clustered firms experience resource
 cost and access advantages, heightened competitor awareness, and en-
 hanced legitimacy, which allow the cluster to dominate industry growth
 and innovation, leading to the hot spot identity. Over time, however, the
 clustered firms begin to experience resource diseconomies, insular com-
 petitive practices, less frequent innovation, and lost dominance in the in-
 dustry.
 The pattern of hot spot evolution captured by the punctuated equilib-
 rium model is cast against a background of overall industry evolution.
 The hot spot initially grows faster than the industry, but then it experiences
 declines not felt by the competitors outside of the hot spot, as shown in
 Figure 1. Within the punctuated equilibrium framework, a macroview of
 the dynamic processes of innovation is culled from the following research
 streams: (a) population ecology, (b) industrial organization (particularly
 within a regional or geographic context), (c) institutions, and (d) manage-
 rial cognition. The major theoretical elements we use in our model are
 summarized in Table 1, and their relationships are shown in Figure 2.
 THE ORIGINATION PHASE OF HOT SPOTS
 Organization ecologists have indicated that firms sometimes cluster
 in an area after an initial start-up to seize a niche-a particular combina-
 tion of resources required to support a given type of organizational popula-
 tion (Hannan & Freeman, 1989). Lomi observed that "the recurrence of
 patterns of organizational concentration in space across different in-
 dustries and in a number of national contexts provides indirect evidence
 that location may be a general factor shaping the evolution of organiza-
 tions" (1995: 111). If location provided an evolutionary advantage, then
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 TABLE 1
 Theoretical Foundations Applied to Competitive Behavior and
 Innovation in Hot Spots
 Relationship to Behavior of
 Theoretical Foundation Specific Application Hot Spot
 Punctuated equilibrium Origination Growth
 model Convergence Stabilization
 Reorientation Decline and realignment
 Deep structure Entrenchment
 Environmental jolts
 Organization ecology Populations and Competition and growth in
 subpopulations subpopulations and
 populations
 Resource-based theory Competitive advantage Specialized resources and
 Competitive parity information
 Change in resources
 Institutional theory Organization field Legitimacy
 Collectivities Macrocultures
 Isomorphism Inertia
 Management cognition Information salience Competitors' mental models
 Cognitive bias Bias in the competitors'
 assessment
 Economic geography Economies of agglomeration Reasons for cluster formation
 FIGURE 2
 Forces Affecting the Evolution of Hot Spots
 Resource
 Conditions
 Institutional Competitive Innovation
 Processes Behavior Performance
 Management's
 Mental Models
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 organizational populations would not be homogeneous, geographical
 proximity would play a role in competitive behavior, and birth and death
 rates for firms would vary systematically across locations (Baum & Mezias,
 1992; Lomi, 1995). Firms clustered in one location would define a subpopula-
 tion within the total industry population, face different resource availabil-
 ity and competitive practices, and could evolve independently of other
 industry participants (Hannan & Carroll, 1992). The organizational ecology
 literature, therefore, supports the notion that geographically clustered
 firms may differ from firms outside the cluster regarding cost structures,
 competitive behavior, and performance over time.
 In the following paragraphs on the origination of hot spots, we use
 arguments from the resource-based theory of the firm, institutional theory,
 and cognitive theory to explain (a) why clusters form, (b) where clusters
 form, and (c) why the competitive behavior and innovation performance
 of clustered firms may differ from nonclustered firms within the same in-
 dustry.
 Early Resource Conditions
 As Scott (1992) noted, it is difficult to identify the emergence of a cluster
 before it occurs. Interest in identifying the precursor conditions has led
 researchers to study the location factors that would seem to catalyze the
 emergence of industry clusters: military bases, research universities, sci-
 ence parks, international airports, venture capital firms, and recreational
 facilities (Markusen, Hall, & Glasmeir, 1986). Results about the role these
 factors play in the emergence of clusters have been inconclusive (Haug,
 1991). For example, when only precursor location factors are considered,
 it remains unclear why the semiconductor industry developed in Silicon
 Valley (Scott, 1989). Stanford University provided engineering personnel
 and a high-technology industrial park. There were some preexisting elec-
 tronics firms in the region, and there were many military and aerospace
 facilities as potential customers in the San Francisco Bay Area. However,
 equally favorable conditions existed elsewhere, such as in Phoenix, Ari-
 zona, and Dallas, Texas (Scott, 1989).
 There seems to be an element of chance to the origin and initial
 location of geographical clusters of firms (Rauch, 1993). In some ways,
 clusters of firms are analogous to forests of trees. Although one cannot
 anticipate exactly when or where the first seed will land within a field,
 once the seed is implanted, it is highly likely more trees will follow.
 Similarly, clusters of firms sometimes originate from a single fast-growing
 and successful new start-up firm (Saxenian, 1994). If several new firms
 spin off from a common parent, or set of parents, then a cluster of like firms
 could begin spontaneously (Maarten de Vet & Scott, 1992). For example, 31
 semiconductor firms were started in Silicon Valley during the 1960s, and
 a majority could trace their lineage to Fairchild Semiconductor (Saxenian,
 1994). In a survey of software firms in Washington state (a region with a
 high concentration of software industry employment and sales), Haug
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 (1991) found that 52% of new-firm founders were employed within the
 software industry in Washington before starting their own businesses.
 When firms are started by entrepreneurs who leave existing organizations,
 quality-of-life features, existing knowledge of suppliers, and familiarity
 with the labor market can play a role in the decision to stay in the region
 (Haug, 1991).
 Once the initial site is implanted-through spontaneous spin-off or
 location factors-there are compelling economic and institutional reasons
 for new start-ups to continue to locate near competitors. As the first firm
 becomes successful, qualified suppliers, skilled workers, and informed
 investors become available, which lowers the cost of entry for subsequent
 firms, making the area relatively more attractive than other areas. These
 cost advantages within the cluster are called agglomeration economies
 (Rauch, 1993; Scott, 1992). Agglomeration economies encourage growth in
 numbers of new firms, which are either attracted by the technical and
 resource base or created from spin-offs in the region (Melecki, 1985). As
 Scott noted:
 Because the growth of any complex also brings about a combi-
 natorial extension of the set of interfirm transactional possibili-
 ties, the organizational flexibility of the whole system tends
 by the same token to increase. Individual producers are able
 to build and rebuild external contacts with increasing ease
 and speed, which means they can change all the more readily.
 The proliferation of increasingly more specialized producers
 in any given complex tends to result in continual reduction of
 the costs of production. (1989: 29)
 Institutional Processes
 In addition to the benefits of lower costs and superior resources for
 clustered firms, firms also have an incentive to cluster to enhance legiti-
 macy and avoid the liability of newness (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Singh,
 Tucker, & House, 1986). One primary method for enhancing legitimacy is
 to participate in interfirm relationships within the cluster (Scott, 1989). In
 high-technology hot spots, such as Silicon Valley, Route 128, the Scientific
 City in France, and the ceramics production complex in Sassuolo, Italy,
 competitors have formed intricate networks of interdependencies (Porter,
 1990; Scott, 1989). They share ties to a research base such as a university
 (including consulting researchers, laboratories, and libraries), a skilled
 labor pool, a network of highly qualified suppliers, and a knowledgeable
 pool of venture capitalists (Bania et al., 1992; Maarten de Vet & Scott, 1992;
 Porter, 1990; Rees & Stafford, 1986; Scott, 1989). Efforts to create interrelation-
 ships encourage the initial formation of the cluster, and these relationships
 hold the cluster together over time (Scott, 1989).
 Groups of proximal rivals stimulate creation of a local infrastructure
 and expanded supply of skilled labor and resources (Porter, 1990). As
 groups of local competitors work quickly to create an industry's infrastruc-
 ture and credibility, they derive cost and time savings through their affilia-
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 tion and proximity (Porter, 1990; Scott, 1989). As the emerging industry
 subpopulation gains legitimacy within the region, access to capital and
 markets improves (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 1995). Thus, with an
 increased number of organizations comes increased legitimacy (Hannan &
 Freeman, 1989).
 Therefore, once firms begin to amass in one area, they experience
 agglomeration economies and subgroup legitimacy that fuel growth of
 the cluster, and this is at the expense of growth among nonclustered firms.
 Clustered firms develop a form of first-mover advantage that discourages
 formation of other clusters or agglomerations (Scott, 1989, 1992). Although
 membership in the geographical cluster is not a requirement for participa-
 tion in an industry, proximity lowers the cost and risk of firms' entering
 the industry and contracting for resources and services (Bania et al., 1992).
 These arguments lead to our first proposition.
 Proposition 1: During the origination phase of evolution,
 geographically clustered firms will experience greater
 cost economies and legitimacy than industry competitors
 that are outside of the cluster.
 Early Managerial and Organizational Mental Models
 In addition to the cost and access characteristics of the industry clus-
 ter, there is a cognitive dimension as well. Within an emerging cluster,
 several factors create a propensity for managers and key technical em-
 ployees to have similar cognitive frameworks or mental models.3 Building
 on research in top management cognition, we believe that the fact that
 managers and employees are all participating in the same industry sug-
 gests they have similar industry experiences and technical training (Huff,
 1982; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986; Spender, 1989). For example, in the case of
 managers and employees of a high-technology industry, specific technical
 education available at a few research institutions would create common
 or similar educational experiences and affiliations, and, in all likelihood,
 draw from a common age cohort. That individuals want to identify with
 and take part in the particular business opportunity suggests that their
 values and perceptions are similar (e.g., a propensity toward entrepreneur-
 ship and risk taking). All of these factors work together, increasing the
 likelihood that the mental models of managers and employees are some-
 what similar, even at the earliest stages of the hot spot formation.
 Once an agglomeration of firms has begun to form, the experiences
 of firms within the cluster would promote the continued evolution of similar
 mental models of strategists and managers. According to Gersick (1991),
 the experiences of firms in the early stage of innovation influence creation
 'Following Walsh's definition (1995: 286), we define a mental model or knowledge struc-
 ture as "a mental template consisting of organized knowledge about an information environ-
 ment that enables interpretation and action in that environment."
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 of managers' deep structures and the cognitive frameworks, which, in
 turn, establish the competitive rules of the game. For example, managers
 are more attentive to the actions of firms in their subpopulation because
 segregating mechanisms that distinguish organizational subpopulations
 also act to focus the attention of managers (Hannan & Freeman, 1989;
 Haveman, 1993). In the case of clusters, geographical proximity and the
 attendant interdependent resource base act as segregating mechanisms.
 Several authors have identified geographical proximity as a segregat-
 ing mechanism that influences managers' mental models of competitors. In
 describing such mental models, Porac, Thomas, and Emme (1987) proposed
 that these models will be more complex for frequent competitors and will
 incorporate focal categories of perceived organizational characteristics,
 including location, to discern competitors from noncompetitors. Porac,
 Thomas, and Baden-Fuller (1989) provided indirect evidence for the previ-
 ous research, noting that psychological segmentation of competitors in the
 Scottish knitwear industry was supported by the industry's geographical
 homogeneity.
 In geographical clusters, proximity makes information about local
 competitors more available because managers are better able to scan
 the activities of local competitors compared to the activities of outside
 competitors. Frequent social and professional interactions, dependence on
 a common supplier base, and recruitment from a common, highly mobile
 professional labor pool would lead to a high level of information exchange
 among managers and an awareness of the capabilities of local competi-
 tors (Porter, 1990; Reger & Huff, 1993; Saxenian, 1994; Scott, 1989). Moreover,
 the face-to-face interaction that underlies these forms of information ex-
 change is superior for interpreting social cues, capturing psychoemotional
 reactions, and resolving uncertain and ambiguous issues (Nohria & Eccles,
 1992). Information available to managers about local competitors' innova-
 tive activities could be increased in a number of ways, which are further
 discussed in Table 2.
 As they face an expanding cluster of competitors, managers would
 also face limited memory capacity for storage and retrieval of information
 on competitors. In attempting to use limited memory capacity efficiently,
 managers will store information according to its availability (Tversky &
 Kahneman, 1973). Information that is readily available in memory can be
 linked to events and examples that dominate a person's settings; such
 information and events are said to be salient (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Consis-
 tent with the greater availability of information on nearby competitors,
 managers in hot spots will find such information to be salient.4
 The previous discussion implies that the mental models of managers
 in clusters will be greatly influenced by their local competitors, thereby
 'Among the salient events selectively attended to and stored in memory are those
 that are sharply drawn, including the behaviors and outcomes of competitors (Keisler &
 Sproull, 1982).
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 TABLE 2
 Why Information About Local Competitors is More Salient
 Mobile Labor Force
 Information about competitors' activity seeps from one firm to the next as mobile
 workers move from employer to employer within the cluster. Mobility and recruitment
 opportunities are greater within the cluster as managers seek available jobs rather
 distant jobs, which would uproot their families. For example, in Silicon Valley, 80% of
 semiconductor production engineers who quit their jobs moved to another firm in the
 local labor market (Angel, 1989). The availability of jobs increases job hopping and short
 job tenure (Saxenian, 1994). As Andy Grove of Intel said, "A popular joke about Silicon
 Valley is that all you have to do to change jobs is turn left instead of right when you
 come out of your driveway" (1987: 156).
 Extrafirm Conversations
 Social interactions in the community can result in information spills and leaks about
 competitors' plans. Social interactions among proximate competitors take various forms:
 (a) common membership in political and religious organizations, country and athletic
 clubs, and community or business professional organizations, such as Rotary;
 (b) involvement in local arts, athletic, and civic groups, such as children's soccer; and
 (c) residence in the same neighborhoods, such as Bloomfield Hills, in which Detroit's
 competing automaker executives interact socially (Yates, 1984).
 Cooperative Alliances
 Proximity to university, strategic, supplier, and government alliances means
 (a) frequent opportunities to discuss and observe competitors' activities (Scott, 1992) and
 (b) information being exchanged (spilled) through contacts among groups of scientists
 and engineers (Bania et al., 1992).
 Direct Observation
 Firms may observe directly the capacity expansions, technological investments, and
 hiring efforts of competitors at nearby facilities, which provides clues to competitors'
 strategies.
 Media
 Local newspapers, business journals, television stations, and radio stations will
 provide more detailed coverage of local competitors, which will increase the speed of
 response for firms that hear the publicity (Smith & Grimm, 1991).
 increasing opportunities for managers to generalize from the clustered
 subpopulation to the total industry population. These arguments are sup-
 ported by organizational ecology theories of density dependence. As noted
 by Lomi (1995), founders of businesses will be more sensitive to local levels
 of legitimacy and competition because of their limited capacity to collect
 information on nonlocal competitors and the ambiguity of interpreting
 meanings from a distance. In the context of innovation, this suggests
 that managers would increasingly focus on the innovative activity and
 capabilities of competitors inside the cluster.
 Managers and strategists outside of the cluster, in contrast, will be
 faced with similar limited memory capacities and incentives to develop
 simplified mental models, but they will be unlikley to focus on location
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 and geography as the basis for that simplification. Outside the cluster,
 information about competitors inside the cluster will be less salient and
 less available. Although nonclustered managers and strategists will de-
 velop simplified models, they will not simplify using a common location
 frame of reference. As we show in subsequent sections, the mental models
 of clustered competitors will play a role in increasing innovation activity
 in the cluster in the short run, but they will undermine innovative activity
 in the longer run. The relationships provide a foundation for the follow-
 ing proposition:
 Proposition 2: During the origination phase, managers
 of clustered firms will be more attuned to the strategies
 and capabilities of competitors inside the cluster com-
 pared to competitors outside the cluster. Managers of
 nonclustered firms will not show a similar tendency.
 Competitive Behavior and Innovation
 What are the implications of these resource conditions, legitimizing
 processes, and mental models for competitive behavior and innovation
 during the formation phase of hot spot evolution? The shared resource
 base, agglomeration economies, increased legitimacy, prevalence of sim-
 plified mental models, and the salience of local competitor information
 create a dynamic environment, which we argue is characterized by in-
 creasing numbers of clustered firms, emergence of the hot spot identity,
 a tension between cooperation and intense competition, and high levels
 of innovation.
 Competitive behavior. As proposed in the previous section, competitors
 within the cluster will experience agglomeration economies that provide
 access and cost advantages that are not available to nonclustered competi-
 tors. Furthermore, the established regional infrastructure of research, sup-
 pliers, and labor would make entry and spin-off easier within the cluster
 than outside the cluster (Porter, 1980; Saxenian, 1994). In keeping with the
 logic of the resource-based view, competitors outside the region will face
 higher costs when recruiting and relocating highly specialized employees
 and when transacting with suppliers and researchers (Grant, 1991; Porter,
 1990). They will find it difficult to imitate the complex routines involved in the
 infrastructure of the clustered subpopulation and will face more imperfect
 information than clustered firms when assessing the value of industry re-
 sources and innovation opportunities (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991).
 The agglomeration economies and shared resources available to firms
 within the cluster are not a source of competitive advantage for specific
 clustered firms. Instead, once exploited, they help ensure the survival of
 clustered firms by creating competitive parity (Barney, 1991) and increas-
 ing the probability of economic survival of the cluster as a whole (Porter,
 1980). Competitors outside of the cluster would not have access to the cost
 advantages and enhanced legitimacy of agglomeration, and they would
 struggle to maintain competitive parity with the clustered competitors.
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 The preferential growth conditions within the cluster would result in faster
 growth for firms within the cluster, leading to the hot spot identity.
 Proposition 3: During the origination phase, the rate of
 growth in numbers of competitors within the cluster will
 exceed the rate of growth in numbers of competitors out-
 side of the cluster, leading to the hot spot identity.
 Industry innovation. During the early stage of hot spot formation,
 conditions are ripe for high levels of innovation. Three forces work to
 center industry innovation activity within the hot spot: (a) the increasing
 number of competitors within the hot spot, many of which are created as
 spin-offs; (b) the proximity and shared resources among competing firms
 within the hot spot; and (c) the mental models that emphasize the resources
 and capabilities of hot spot competitors.
 Because new spin-offs are often created in response to an unfilled
 market need (Haug, 1991), spin-offs are likely to maintain similar supplier
 and resource arrangements within the cluster to take advantage of ag-
 glomeration economies, but they will compete through a strategy that
 emphasizes differentiation from other hot spot competitors (Baum &
 Mezias, 1992). If created by spin-off, the clustered firms are predisposed
 to a higher level of knowledge about the capabilities and strategic intent
 of local competitors (Carroll, 1993), which serves as an accurate form of
 competitive intelligence and can focus the differentiation and innovation
 efforts of those firms.
 Proximity, shared resource arrangements, and an emerging hot spot
 identity would also contribute to a heightened innovative environment.
 Clusters are able to harness local pride as a motivating force that ener-
 gizes firm behavior (Porter, 1990). The entrepreneurial spirit fostered by
 the large number of spin-offs and start-up firms would fuel a culture of
 innovation and fast change. Also, the emerging network of alliances
 among the labor pool, suppliers, idea generators, and competitors would
 stimulate an environment of creativity and idea exchange (Saxenian, 1994).
 Finally, formal and informal information exchange among competitors,
 suppliers, and other related businesses would leak information about
 competitors and their innovation practices (Baum & Mezias, 1992; Saxe-
 nian, 1994), contributing to firms' well-developed competitive intelligence
 within the cluster (refer to Table 2).
 When the salience of information on local competitors intensifies,
 managers should have richer mental models of competitors' activities
 inside the cluster compared to competitors' activities outside the cluster.
 Deeper knowledge of local competitors and their innovative strategies
 will enable managers to focus their attention on developing innovations
 that compete more effectively with local competitors than with outside
 competitors. To the extent that salience dictates a dichotomy in innova-
 tive strategies, managers will have two mental models of competitors' in-
 novative strategies-one for hot spot competitors and one for outside
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 competitors. Intense competition and rich mental models would lead to
 high levels of innovation within the hot spot.
 Arguments for intense local competition leading to high levels of
 innovation within the hot spot are also supported by organizational ecol-
 ogy theory. According to organizational ecology, the intensity of competi-
 tion among firms is largely a function of the similarity in resource require-
 ments (Hannan & Carroll, 1992; Hannan & Freeman, 1989). Although the
 origination phase of hot spot evolution may be marked by cooperation
 among competitors to gain legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Suchman,
 1995), research suggests that the relationships would likely deteriorate,
 leading to increased competition and spurring industry-level innovation
 (Van de Ven & Garud, 1989). Because firms within the cluster compete
 directly for human, financial, and technological resources, competitive
 intensity will be higher within the hot spot than among clustered firms and
 nonclustered firms. Furthermore, the speed, completeness, and accuracy
 of competitive intelligence among firms within the hot spot, described
 previously, will allow them to outperform their outside competitors in
 assessing opportunities for differentiation. Consequently, we would ex-
 pect the following:
 Proposition 4: During the origination phase, clustered firms
 will be responsible for an increasing proportion of industry
 innovations, compared to nonclustered competitors.
 The resource conditions, institutional processes, and mental models affect-
 ing competitive behavior and innovation during the origination phase are
 summarized in Figure 3.
 THE CONVERGENCE PHASE OF HOT SPOTS
 According to the punctuated equilibrium model, convergent periods
 were described by Tushman and Romanelli (1985: 173) as consisting of
 "long time spans of incremental change and adaptation which elaborate
 structure, systems, controls, and resources toward increased coalignment
 [during which] inertia increases and competitive vigilance decreases"
 (1985: 215). As Gersick (1991) noted, organizations will make adjustments
 that preserve their deep structures against internal and external sources
 of influence. However, many of the assumptions that underlie the deep
 structure change with growth and success. Although a clustered group of
 competitors may continue in convergence indefinitely, its role as a hot
 spot with faster-than-average growth and disproportionate innovative ca-
 pacity is likely to decline. As we show in the following sections, as time
 passes, the agglomeration economies and access advantages may erode,
 and the simplified cognitive frameworks managers used to analyze com-
 petitors may no longer represent the most essential phenomena.
 Convergence and Resource Conditions
 During the origination phase, firms within the hot spot experience
 agglomeration economies and the other benefits attached to belonging to
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 the cluster. As the cluster grows, however, size, congestion, and saturation
 within the hot spot may begin to "choke off" the agglomeration economies.
 Diseconomies of agglomeration may occur as the cost of living, real estate
 prices, and salaries of technical personnel rise (Arthur, 1990; Grove, 1987).
 The abundance of venture capital may create constant start-ups and a
 short-term orientation to investments (Grove, 1987). As the overall industry
 moves through a life cycle, typified by increasing standardization, the
 requirements for the technical and financial resources (university, venture
 capital firms) of the hot spot are reduced, which makes other locations
 relatively more attractive (Melecki, 1985). The economies of agglomeration
 can be undermined in much the same way that manufacturing facilities
 that are too large move from economies of scale to diseconomies of scale,
 and urban areas often grow beyond the ability of the infrastructure to
 adapt. The first-mover advantages that accrued to the first cluster are
 gradually eroded as outside competitors gain strength in the population.
 Proposition 5: Over time, the agglomeration economies
 in the hot spot will erode, and the hot spot firms will
 experience cost economies similar to competitors outside
 of the hot spot.
 Convergence and Managers' Mental Models
 Managers in hot spots face an expanding field of local competitors
 during the transition from origination to convergence. For reasons
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 discussed in Table 2, their access to and awareness of local competitors
 would grow over time. The ease of social interaction and observation
 afforded by proximity increases the availability and richness of informa-
 tion on local competitors. Because such information would be considered
 important and engaging, its effect is likely to be salient (Sullins, 1989).
 Clustering salient competitor attributes in their mental models allows
 managers to simplify cognitive complexity while enriching their infor-
 mation about important competitors (Porac et al., 1987; Reger & Huff,
 1993). Managers in hot spot firms, then, use mental models to narrow
 the focus of competitors and to provide rich information on local compe-
 titors.
 Mental models based primarily on local competitors will be biased to-
 ward those competitors; at the same time they will direct attention away
 from outside competitors. Consequently, as local competitors increasingly
 dominate the perceptions of managers in the hot spot, competitors outside
 of the industry will be subject to less rigorous scrutiny.5 This intuition is
 supported by Porac and colleagues (1987: 74-75), who, in a study of retailers,
 noted that their "competitive moves will be primarily aimed at countering
 the tactics of firms within the same [competitive] category rather than firms
 in categories not scanned. [The competitive] focus of attention [is] locked in
 by the cognitive structuring effect of the business category so defined."
 Researchers in social cognition showed that, in addition to dominating
 perception, salient stimuli tend to polarize judgments without an individu-
 al's awareness of the effects on subsequent judgments (Fiske, 1993; Mullen &
 Hu, 1988). Because managers within hot spot firms are exposed to the same
 sources of information, it is likely they will form similar perceptions of clus-
 tered competitors' capabilities. As a consequence, competitive judgments
 arising from managers' mental models in hot spots become more homoge-
 neous and reflect less awareness of outside competitors over time. By not
 updating their mental models of competitors, managers will fail to incorpo-
 rate information that conflicts with their established perceptions.
 As noted previously, managers in firms outside of the hot spot also
 will simplify their mental models and direct their attention toward salient
 competitor attributes. However, one key issue distinguishes the nature
 and effect of simplification of mental models for managers inside and
 outside the hot spot. In the absence of proximity, managers outside the
 hot spot will develop their own ways to simplify their mental models
 based on competitor and market attributes that are most salient to them.
 One manager may focus on major market shareholders, whereas another
 may focus on competitors that supply a particular customer segment. In
 'Of course, as inferred from the previous discussion, there are greater opportunities
 for network interaction with outside competitors in the growing hot spot. More suppliers,
 customers, professional societies, social organizations, and so on, will be found outside of
 the cluster in later stages of growth compared to earlier stages of growth. However, these
 opportunities would be overshadowed by the overall ease with which proximity facilitates
 social and professional interaction among competing firms in the hot spot.
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 other words, managers outside the hot spot will be more likely to develop
 different mental models of competition. Managers inside the hot spot,
 influenced by the salience of information on local competitors, will tend
 to develop similar perceptions about competitors. Managers outside the
 hot spot are less likely to form homogeneous perceptions.
 Proposition 6: During the convergence phase, the mental
 models of strategists within hot spot firms will exhibit
 biased assessments of competitors' capabilities and
 place too much emphasis on hot spot competitors and too
 little emphasis on non-hot spot competitors. Managers
 outside the hot spot will not exhibit the same bias.
 Proposition 7: During the convergence phase, strategists
 within hot spots will be more homogeneous in their per-
 ceptions about competitors and industry opportunities
 than will managers outside of the hot spot.
 Convergence and Institutional Processes
 When the homogeneous mental models shared among hot spot man-
 agers are aggregated to the level of firms, the result is what Abrahamson
 and Fombrun described as a macroculture, the "relatively idiosyncratic,
 organization-related beliefs that are shared among top managers across
 organizations" (1994: 730). Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (1993) proposed that
 interdependent networks of competitors, called collectivities, experience
 close to full information about the organization processes and innovation
 capabilities of competitors, which encourages imitation. Zander and Kogut
 (1995) found that a key determinant of the time to imitation of an innovation
 is the extent to which knowledge of processes is common among competi-
 tors within the industry. Given the high level of awareness among competi-
 tors within the hot spot and their tendencies to monitor closely firms that
 are viewed as direct competitors (Haveman, 1993; Porac & Thomas, 1990),
 imitation is likely.
 As researchers of interorganizational networks have observed, the
 collectivity of hot spot firms would be governed by norms of acceptable
 conduct. These norms would be institutionalized through patterns of social
 and professional interactions (see Table 2), human resource training and
 selection, and generally accepted rules of the game that have evolved
 over time (Porac & Thomas, 1994). The mental models that capture those
 organizational forms would be one important component of the collec-
 tive mindset, or macroculture, embedded within the hot spot (Porac &
 Thomas, 1994).
 This collective mindset creates the preconditions that make the hot
 spot firms susceptible to institutional forces that encourage homogene-
 ity. At this point in the evolution of the hot spot, the competitors, sup-
 pliers, local communities, labor force, venture capitalists, and research
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 community begin to exhibit the structure of an organization field. DiMaggio
 (1983) described an organization field as involving four elements, all of
 which are exhibited within hot spots: (a) increased interaction among
 organizations in the field, (b) emergence of dominant competitors and
 patterns of coalition, (c) increased information, and (d) mutual awareness
 of involvement in a common enterprise, or a group identity.
 Once the field is created, uncertainty and institutional pressures work
 to make the organizations more alike. Uncertainty about technologies and
 markets encourages a pattern of conformity through imitation, known as
 mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). When faced with uncer-
 tainty, firms will economize on search costs (Cyert & March, 1963) and
 imitate the actions of other organizations (Haveman, 1993). Hot spots, which
 are often associated with high-technology industries and are, by our defi-
 nition, fast growing (during the origination phase), experience high levels
 of technology and market uncertainty. Hot spots, therefore, will likely
 experience mimetic isomorphism as firms respond to that uncertainty.
 The hot spot context is also susceptible to exaggerated forces of coer-
 cive isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism occurs when procedures, con-
 trols, and structures within the organization field create institutional pres-
 sures for conformity (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Within hot spots, the
 common set of goals, processes, and systems of the suppliers, researchers,
 and venture capital firms work to create homogeneity. For example, a
 dominant local supplier may be capable of meeting a particular quality
 standard; therefore, all local competitors achieve that level of input qual-
 ity. The venture capital firms expect a certain strategy and plan for fund-
 ing, so strategies and plans of firms within the cluster begin to take on
 similar characteristics.
 Finally, the hot spot, because of its identity with a particular research
 university and community, may be susceptible to pressures for normative
 isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). If many of the contract researchers
 and new employees are recruited from the local university and the local
 competitors, they will tend to define problems and filter information in
 the same way (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
 In the origination phase of industry evolution, the benefits of confor-
 mity are legitimacy, stability, access to resources, and the ability to attract
 skilled personnel (Oliver, 1991), all of which provide competitive advan-
 tages to the hot spot firms and contributed to the growth and innovation
 advantages we proposed for the origination phase. Over time, however,
 the institutional processes cause firms to fail to exercise full strategic
 choice (Oliver, 1991) and to be constrained in their ability to change (Di-
 Maggio & Powell, 1983; Powell, 1991).
 Viewed in this way, the strategic myopia associated with competitors'
 blind spots is a collective process (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf, 1993). Homo-
 geneity of managers' beliefs within the macroculture leads to similarities
 in competitive positions, which leads to insularity, sluggishness, and
 failed attempts to innovate (Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994). As described
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 by Yates (1984), these outcomes were evident for U.S. automakers during
 the late 1970s and early 1980s. The complacent and insular "collective
 Detroit mind" was homogenized by the perception that outside (specifi-
 cally, Japanese) competitors were essentially nonexistent and posed no
 threat to U.S. automakers. Despite the consumers' changing preference
 for small cars, Yates pointed out that
 isolated in their Warren and Dearborn enclaves, the American
 experts continued to delude themselves into thinking that the
 old verities of the American marketplace would prevail. In
 their hearts, they believed that the once-sizzling love affair
 between Detroit and the car buyers of the nation could be
 rekindled. (1984: 31)
 Competitive Behavior and Innovation
 As the hot spot moves through the convergence phase, the economies
 of agglomeration and the need for legitimacy that drew new firms to the
 region and provided the cluster with a collective cost and access advan-
 tage erode (Proposition 5). Consequently, firms will be no more likely to
 enter the cluster than to begin business elsewhere. Spin-offs will be no
 more likely to happen in the cluster than outside of the cluster. In terms
 of cost structures, resource access, and patterns of competitor entry and
 exit, the hot spot and the larger industry population will reach parity, and
 there will be no collective advantage for the cluster. In essence, the pat-
 terns of growth for both the cluster and the larger industry population
 will align.
 Proposition 8: In the convergence phase, the hot spot
 industry subpopulation will stabilize compared to the
 larger industry population, experiencing similar pat-
 terns of entry and exit.
 Although entry and exit will stabilize, firms inside and outside of
 the hot spot will continue to differ in their susceptibility to institutional
 pressures for isomorphism, as described previously. The transition toward
 homogeneity, supported by managers' biased mental models and institu-
 tional forces that encourage imitative competitive behavior, will lead to
 a decline in the collective level of innovation coming from the hot spot
 over time. Competitors outside of the hot spot that are not part of the
 collectivity will not be part of the dysfunctional macroculture and will be
 physically separate from the localized sources of isomorphism. The iden-
 tifiable organization field of the clustered firms will continue to evolve along
 a parallel but separate trajectory (Powell, 1991) from nonclustered firms.
 As the convergence phase is fully realized, the following outcomes
 can be expected: (a) firms will not distinguish among local competitors,
 thereby homogenizing perceptions of strategic options and their strategic
 actions (Reger & Huff, 1993); (b) biased cognitive assessments and insular-
 ity will perpetuate homogeneous macrocultures (Abrahamson & Fombrun,
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 1994), (c) institutional forces will encourage homogeneity and inertia (Di-
 Maggio & Powell, 1983), (d) the deep structure, despite changes in competi-
 tor and market conditions, will perpetuate convergence, increase inertia,
 and decrease competitive vigilance (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985); (e) man-
 agers will perpetuate the mental model, which becomes more distorted
 over time, and create competitive blind spots (Porter, 1980); and (f) firms
 will create fewer innovations because of the homogeneity, inertia, and
 dysfunctional macroculture.
 Proposition 9: During the convergence phase, hot spot
 firms will exhibit higher levels of organizational inertia
 and imitative competitive behavior compared to out-
 side competitors.
 Proposition 1O: During the convergence phase, the collec-
 tive level of innovation emanating from the hot spot will
 decrease over time.
 The resource conditions, institutional processes, and mental models
 influencing competitive behavior and innovation in the convergence
 phase are shown in Figure 4.
 FIRM-LEVEL REORIENTATION WITHIN FORMER HOT SPOTS
 As we stated previously, convergence of clustered firms within a larger
 industry population can continue indefinitely. Once the relative rates of
 FIGURE 4
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 growth and innovation stabilize for firms inside and outside of hot
 spots, the cluster will no longer fulfill the definition of a hot spot in terms
 of growth, but it will continue to survive as a tight cluster of competitors.
 The Dalton, Georgia, cluster of carpet makers and the Hickory, North Caro-
 lina, cluster of furniture makers, for example, have existed for decades,
 but they are neither more faster growing nor more innovative as a group
 than are their nonclustered competitors.
 The punctuated equilibrium literature and discussions of cognitive
 bias in industry assessment support the notion that periods of crisis or
 shock often precede fundamental changes in the deep structure of firms
 and their realignment of perceptions with actuality (Gersick, 1991; Tush-
 man & Romanelli, 1985; Zajac & Bazerman, 1991). Following a long period
 of convergence, firms are susceptible to a significant environmental jolt,
 such as a technological shift, emergence of new competitor groups and
 methods, or significant changes in market demand. Environmental jolts
 will likely overwhelm the adaptive processes of organizations (Meyer,
 Brooks, & Goes, 1990) and initiate, for some firms, a period of fundamental
 reorientation (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). In the following sections, we
 argue that clustered and nonclustered competitors differ in their ability
 to anticipate and then react to industrywide jolts. Although some firms
 may reorient themselves successfully, and the region may continue to
 grow through other industries, it is likely the region will no longer be a
 center of innovative activity for the former hot spot industry.
 Environmental Jolts
 Environmental jolts, or Schumpeterian shocks (Barney, 1991; Schum-
 peter, 1934), tend to occur in three phases: (a) an anticipatory phase that
 includes perceptible warning signals, (b) a responsive phase when the
 primary impacts are absorbed, and (c) a readjustment phase (Meyer, 1982).
 As described by Meyer (1982), environmental jolts rarely threaten the sur-
 vival of organizations that are aligned with their environments.
 An organization's ability to anticipate a shock is determined by the
 aggressiveness and accuracy of its environmental-scanning activities
 (Meyer, 1982). As established in our previous discussions, clustered firms
 in the convergence phase exhibit the characteristics of a macroculture, and
 they will conduct limited and biased searches for competitive information
 (Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994). Although firms outside of the hot spot
 may suffer from limited environmental-scanning activities and may miss
 the signals of an impending jolt, for them, such widespread myopia is
 unlikely to exist. Therefore, clustered firms are more likely than nonclus-
 tered firms to miss the signals that would warn them of an impending jolt.
 An organization's ability to respond to a shock is influenced by the inter-
 dependencies that are institutionalized through its structure and processes
 (Meyer, 1982). As previously described, geographically clustered firms often
 exhibit networks of interdependencies with local competitors, research in-
 stitutions, suppliers, and associations, which originally enhanced legiti-
 1996 Pouder and St. John 1213
 macy and ensured agglomeration economies (Scott, 1989). The networks of
 interdependencies that were a source of strength in the origination phase
 become sources of inertia and inflexibility (Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994)
 during a jolt. Consequently, clustered firms will be slower to react to a jolt
 than will their nonclustered competitors.
 Proposition 11: Clustered competitors will be slower to
 recognize and respond to an industrywide environmen-
 tal jolt than will competitors outside of the hot spot.
 Implications for Firm-Level Reorientation
 A reorientation period involves a short burst of discontinuous change
 in which a firm's strategy, structure, power distributions, organization
 culture, and control systems are realigned (Gersick, 1991; Tushman &
 Romanelli, 1985). Reorientations may involve a significant alteration of
 strategy, structure, and systems (Romanelli & Tushman, 1994) and, for more
 entrenched firms, an even more substantial re-creation of core values and
 mental models (Gersick, 1991; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). To dismantle
 their deep structures (Gersick, 1991) so that they can consider alternatives
 outside of their self-imposed boundaries, organizations must change both
 their basic premises and values about the nature of competition (i.e.,
 mental models) and the interrelationships and systems within which they
 operate (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). Given the sweeping scope of change
 required for reorientations, these will likely involve change and develop-
 ment processes at many organizational levels: individual strategists,
 firms, the collectivity of competitors within the former hot spot, and the
 larger organizational field involving suppliers and communities (Van de
 Ven & Poole, 1995).
 Realigning managers' mental models. The mental models described for
 the convergence phase provide a useful starting point for explaining whether
 managers are well prepared to deal effectively with environmental jolts. Ac-
 cording to research in social cognition, once mental models are formed they
 tend to persist, even in the face of contrary evidence (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). In
 addition to individuals, established mental models can be common to a social
 group such as managers (McKaskey, 1982). Historically salient material per-
 sists in managers' memories and continues to influence what they interpret
 as salient in current situations (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982). For example, when
 making judgments about current problems, managers often use mental mod-
 els to "fill in" information that stems from a great deal of experience with prior
 problems (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982: 560). In sum, as these managers access new
 information about competitors, they rely on a class of anachronistic mental
 models, framed in an environment that no longer exists (Porac & Thomas, 1990).
 If managers use salient information about local competitors to evalu-
 ate outside competitors, they will ignore or misinterpret the organizational
 crisis ushered in by an environmental jolt. In the words of Yates, "Detroit
 was convinced that American consumers insisted on instant gratification,
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 ignoring the example of thousands of devoted Honda buyers who were
 patiently waiting six months or more for their small silver chariots"
 (1984: 62-63).
 Proposition 12: Compared to strategists in firms outside
 of the hot spot, the mental models of strategists in firms
 inside the hot spot will exhibit higher levels of cognitive
 inertia and entrenchment that inhibit initiation of a firm-
 level reorientation following an environmental jolt.
 Environmental jolts rock the very foundation of an organization, leav-
 ing fissures in the deep structure and sometimes causing the eventual
 collapse of the organization. The strategic action or inaction of top man-
 agement will determine how strong or how weak the remaining organiza-
 tional foundation will be. Managers who anticipate the need for reorienta-
 tion and install radical changes have been associated with more
 successful realignment, whereas managers who are either unable to adapt
 or refuse to adapt are often replaced (Tushman, Newman, & Romanelli,
 1986). The research results imply that the environmental jolt or crisis
 worked to alter strategists' dysfunctional mental models of competitors,
 so that they could recognize the need for change and reorientation. Thus,
 mental models become realigned with a new industry environment. Orga-
 nizations that fail to overcome cognitive inertia and realign their mental
 models are not likely to survive.
 Proposition 13: Within those former hot spot firms that
 initiate a radical response to the environmental jolt, the
 mental models of strategists will be realigned (through
 replacement or change) with new assumptions about
 competitors, markets, and industry boundaries.
 Resisting institutional forces. For individual firms, the crisis of failed
 innovations and declining performance provides the impetus for change,
 but it does not automatically create change. The effects of institutional
 forces, distorted mental models, and the resulting deep structure may run
 too deep. As Gersick noted, "As long as events occur against a backdrop
 of the same deep structure, they are treated or interpreted in ways that
 preserve the system's inertia and, therefore, incremental solutions are
 sought. The handwriting on the wall cannot be read" (1991: 22).
 When faced with an environmental jolt, firms that have altered their
 mental models (through changes in managers' mental models or replace-
 ment of existing managers) and can recognize the dangers of conformity
 are likely to begin to resist institutional processes. When organizations
 perceive that the value of compliance with institutional norms is low
 and that those norms are not compatible with new organizational goals,
 the organization will dismiss or ignore the norms (Oliver, 1991). For ex-
 ample, a firm in the former hot spot may initiate a marketing or product-
 development strategy that departs from convention. In some cases, organi-
 zations may actively challenge institutional norms (Oliver, 1991). For
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 example, a firm may confront suppliers or labor leaders in an effort to
 change traditional norms of behavior, or it may relocate out of the region.
 Some firms will not shed their old mental models of competition and
 innovation. Consequently, those firms will not recognize the need for radi-
 cal change, will not resist institutional pressures for homogeneity, and
 will likely not survive the environmental jolt. They will initiate only those
 incremental solutions allowed within the old cognitive framework (Ger-
 sick, 1991). Fast-paced, radical change of structure, strategy, practices,
 methods, and beliefs is more likely to result in improved firm performance
 compared to incremental adaptive changes (Miller & Friesen, 1982; Roma-
 nelli & Tushman, 1994; Virany, Tushman, & Romanelli, 1992). When the
 incremental changes fail to create significant improvements in perfor-
 mance, the firms will be unable to initiate the type of fundamental restruc-
 turing required to dismantle their old deep structures.
 Proposition 14: Only those firms that undergo a signifi-
 cant change in their organization's structure and pro-
 cesses will survive a hot spot failure.
 Implications for the Former Hot Spot
 Even if firms change significantly, it is unlikely the hot spot will
 survive. The resource base and interrelationships of the geographical
 area may have little value after the jolt, particularly if new suppliers or
 technologies are needed for such a change. One might argue that the
 vulnerability of the hot spot would decrease as some local competitors
 develop effective approaches that ultimately could be adopted by others.
 Unfortunately, it is the very nature of geographically circumscribed compe-
 tition-the continuous benchmarking of other local competitors and the
 networks of interdependencies-that virtually locks all managers into a
 similar, parochial view of competition. Consequently, opportunities for
 interorganizational learning about outside competitors are inadequate.
 By collectively benchmarking local competitors who had similar problems,
 managers in minicomputer firms located on Route 128 could not respond
 to both the technological and market shifts for personal computers. Guided
 by anachronistic mental models that persisted under conditions of local
 competition, cognitive reorientation in this hot spot was stifled.
 Two theoretical, philosophical approaches exist for managing the
 regional implications of a hot spot failure: incubation and intervention.
 The incubation view is consistent with organizational ecology and the
 natural evolution of populations. The intervention approach is more com-
 patible with the interests of regional economists, and it involves proactive
 efforts to sustain and support existing hot spots. These two views are
 discussed in the following paragraphs.
 Incubation. A hot spot may be viewed as an incubator of start-ups
 and spin-offs during the origination phase of evolution. When hot spot
 firms have stretched the incubation capability of the region, the ties to
 the hot spot are no longer needed. Because the advantages of agglomera-
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 tion and cooperation within the hot spot were largely undermined at the
 later part of the convergence phase, a firm's survival will be dependent on
 firm-level resources and capabilities rather than agglomeration benefits.
 According to the incubator view, firms seek their own strategic re-
 sponses that suit their circumstances, without any involvement by the
 community or regional policy makers. A natural evolution of the hot spot
 is likely to occur, some firms will change firm-level reorientations, and an
 even smaller subset of those firms will achieve improved performance.
 As a result of the natural progression of change, some firms will fail and
 other firms will thrive within the former hot spot region. New firms, and
 possibly new hot spots, will be born in new locations, and some firms
 from the former hot spot will relocate out of the region, as they all seek
 new sites of agglomeration economies and supportive infrastructure. The
 cluster will no longer represent an industry-specific hot spot.
 These arguments are supported in part by the views of organization
 ecologists. According to these researchers, when population inertia is
 great, significant changes and renewal within the population will come
 primarily through the birth and death of organizations (Hannan & Carroll,
 1992; Hannan & Freeman, 1989). Because firms in the former hot spot will
 not be developing innovations that have value in the marketplace, the
 size of the former hot spot will shrink, and more efficient firms will prevail
 (Zammuto, 1988). The dearth of innovations within the former hot spot will
 create opportunities for new and existing firms within the larger industry
 population (Zammuto, 1988).
 Why will few firms from the former hot spot thrive? During the long
 process of hot spot convergence, industry competitors outside of the hot
 spot will have developed innovations and organizational efficiencies that
 were instrumental in isolating the hot spot in the first place. Even if firms
 in former hot spots attempt to formulate strategies that address ineffi-
 ciency and stagnation, they would lag far behind those outside competi-
 tors. The local resource base may no longer provide value. Furthermore,
 the homogeneity or misdirected innovative efforts and competitive blind
 spots of firms inside the hot spot suggest their basic inability to deal with
 inefficiency or technical stagnation or both. Firms within the former hot
 spot would be playing catch-up with other industry competitors, and many
 of them would not have the organizational wherewithal to adapt.
 During the convergence phase, hot spot firms evolved while being
 isolated from industry trends and competitive events, which exacerbated
 their existence as a subpopulation within the larger industry population.
 As a subpopulation evolves separately from the total population, it will
 show less fit with the environment and "will tend to be eliminated. The
 stable equilibrium will then contain only one population which can be
 said to be isomorphic to the environment" (Hannan & Freeman, 1989: 934).
 This evolutionary destruction has been observed in several hot spots.
 In some cases, the entire center of gravity for industry innovation shifts
 elsewhere. Although individual firms will survive and thrive, the former
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 hot spot region will lose its identity. It is likely that the community and
 region will suffer declines in employment growth, new business forma-
 tions, and economic vitality, as was experienced in Detroit, on Boston's
 Route 128, and in Silicon Valley.
 Proposition 15: Following a jolt, the former hot spot will ex-
 perience disproportionate losses in growth and innovation
 compared to competitors outside of the hot spot.
 Intervention. In regional science and economic geography, a primary
 concern of policy makers and communities is to prevent deterioration of
 the hot spot. They would attempt to restore the hot spot to its original level
 of growth and innovation by re-creating the conditions of the origination
 phase. Scott (1992) noted that, in theory, declining hot spots might be
 revived by local economic-development policies designed to stimulate
 R&D, skills training for the local labor force, business support services to
 guide reorientation and restructuring efforts, public sponsorship of inter-
 firm networks to encourage new joint ventures and alliances, and effective
 management of the local infrastructure, through land-use planning, tax
 policies, and development of science parks, so that the economies of ag-
 glomeration can be restored.
 Such efforts do not ensure successful restoration of a hot spot. It is
 difficult to create the conditions to spawn a new hot spot, and it would
 be just as difficult to re-create or sustain a hot spot (Scott, 1992). Collective
 efforts by policy makers and communities to guide hot spot behavior may
 represent yet another source of institutional pressure designed to isolate
 the hot spot from real competitive forces and to encourage sameness
 among hot spot competitors.
 The resource conditions, institutional processes, and mental models
 influencing competitive behavior and innovation following an environ-
 mental jolt are shown in Figure 5.
 CONCLUSION
 The model of hot spots developed in this article evokes theories from
 the levels of individual manager, firm, collectivity, and industry to show
 how geographically clustered competition can affect innovation over time.
 To explain the interplay between levels, our framework juxtaposes schools
 of thought in a common setting and, at the same time, preserves theoretical
 pluralism (Astley & Van de Ven, 1983). Specifically, we propose complemen-
 tary explanations of multilevel phenomena to show how geographic clus-
 tering of competing firms affects innovation over time. Rather than assume,
 as have some theorists, that processes of convergence and reorientation
 in the structure of an industry simply unfold (Meyer et al., 1990), we specify
 mechanisms for such changes.
 The theory of innovation in hot spots advanced in this article extends
 punctuated equilibrium theory because evolutionary competitive selec-
 tion and managerial enactment are reviewed as simultaneous, rather than
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 FIGURE 5
 Key Forces Affecting the Evolution of Hot Spots Following a Jolt
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 isolated, change processes (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). Placing organiza-
 tions in the context of hot spots has implications for the way organization
 ecologists perceive how exogenous changes redefine viable niches and
 affect the emergence of new organizational forms. Moreover, by incorporat-
 ing research from economic geography, we have responded to Baum and
 Mezias (1992), who advised that studies at the population level should
 incorporate economic models of spatial competition.
 More generally, the framework presented here links three areas of
 management research that some scholars view as key areas for future
 work: (a) competitive dynamics viewed from different perspectives,
 (b) industry transformations, and (c) dominant logic (Prahalad & Hamel,
 1994). Through this framework, we consider competitive dynamics using
 a different unit of analysis that could be applied to studies of strategic
 groups and other subpopulations. Also, we consider the pacing and pro-
 cesses of industry transformation by focusing on the dynamics between
 firms inside and outside of hot spots. Finally, we link the mental models
 of managers to competitive dynamics and industry transformation. The
 next sections explain how the conceptual framework may be used both
 to guide conceptual and empirical research and to address policy issues.
 Implications For Theory and Research
 Our model of hot spots provides three avenues for future research.
 First, and most basic, the model invites theory-building research directed
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 toward broadening and deepening explanations of the events giving rise
 to hot spots: What specific cooperative arrangements in clusters of compet-
 ing firms would make hot spots more likely, and how do they compare
 with such arrangements found among outside competitors? To what extent
 are the clusters that ultimately become hot spots formed through random
 versus predictable processes? Researchers of system dynamics using
 mathematical analysis, for example, could explore differences between
 some of the variables used to compare hot spots and outside industry
 competitors. In particular, nonlinear models and chaotic processes may
 offer better explanations of dynamic relationships (Van de Ven & Poole,
 1995).
 Organization researchers must also reassess the generalizability of
 experimental contexts in social cognition to better specify variables in
 mental models, especially those most closely associated with the forma-
 tion of competitor clusters: What contextual variables would help explain
 systematic differences in the formation of mental models in clustered
 and nonclustered competing firms? When and how do specific types of
 information become salient in a manager's mental model of competitors?
 Do other features, such as the vividness of competitors, contribute to the
 salience of attributes?
 We have drawn from the institutional viewpoint to explain clustering
 of competing firms in the same industry. We proposed that managers'
 mental models of competitors become similar, contributing to a macrocul-
 ture, which, in turn, leads to homogeneity and inertia within the cluster
 of local competitors. Greater attention to modeling causal links between
 cognitive and institutional processes is required. For example, institu-
 tional theorists could benefit from recognizing the contribution that in-
 dividual actors can make to innovation processes (Jennings & Zand-
 berger, 1995).
 In addition to descriptive research on hot spots, there is a need for
 prescriptive models that address successful reorientation among firms
 competing in hot spots. Although there is a need for greater empirical
 evidence before such models can be developed, the ideas presented on
 hot spots lead naturally to several research topics: Can firms initiate
 organizational-development efforts that modify organizational culture and
 lead to restructuring activities that refocus the firms' competitive priori-
 ties? Are successful reorientations more likely when top managers are
 hired from outside the cluster and existing managers are replaced prior
 to an environmental jolt (Virany et al., 1992)? Can new suppliers, new
 sources of technical and skilled labor, or relocation out of the region
 dismantle institutional pressures on a firm to conform?
 Clearly, there are other ways to extend conceptual research on organi-
 zational change that can inform the understanding of innovation. For
 example, in recent work on organizational change processes, Van de Ven
 and Poole (1995) posited that different generative mechanisms of change
 can operate simultaneously. Their typology repositions punctuated equi-
 librium as the interplay, rather than the mutually exclusive operation, of
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 time-dependent change. Such change is driven in opposing directions by
 competitive selection (convergence) and purposeful managerial enact-
 ment (reorientation). Future work on the organization level in hot spots
 could benefit from this typology's conceptual clarity and orderly presenta-
 tion of complex issues.
 The second avenue for future research suggested by our model of hot
 spots is theory testing within geographically determined boundaries. By
 studying managers and firms, strategy researchers could address ques-
 tions concerning the definition and evolution of strategic groups. Do com-
 petitors in hot spots form well-defined, "natural" strategic groups that are
 more accurate representations of strategic groups formed on a tautological
 basis (Barney & Hoskisson, 1990)? What is the relationship between "com-
 petitive groups" (firms that compete against one another) and "strategic
 groups" (firms that compete using similar strategies) (Reger & Huff, 1993:
 118)? By applying techniques used by Porac and his colleagues (1987, 1989,
 1994), researchers could explore the following question: What roles do
 managers' mental models play in the formation of strategic groups? Can
 greater insight be gained about the relationships between evolution of
 strategic groups and evolution of industries and the nature of mobility
 barriers (McGee & Thomas, 1986)? Researchers also could study the link
 between managers' mental models of competitors and homogeneity in
 innovation strategies of firms in hot spots (Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994;
 Prahalad & Bettis, 1986; Spender, 1989).
 Perhaps by adapting entropy measures of density developed by eco-
 nomic geographers, organization ecologists could get a true picture of
 competitive interactions between populations and subpopulations (Han-
 nan & Carroll, 1992). One might construct indicators of institutionalization
 in innovation strategies over time using methods proposed by Abraham-
 son and Rosenkopf (1993) to evaluate bandwagon effects across clustered
 competitors. Cumulated over time, interdisciplinary empirical findings
 may allow researchers to answer long-standing questions. Because firms
 in hot spots operate in predominantly technical environments (Meyer &
 Scott, 1983), would one expect the competitive pressures espoused by orga-
 nizational ecologists to better predict a decline in innovation over time
 compared to the various forms of institutional isomorphism (cf. DiMaggio &
 Powell, 1983; Scott, 1991)? In contrast, would the integration of organization
 ecology and institutional theory fortify researchers' interpretations of pro-
 cesses that occur in hot spots over time? Finally, investigators could con-
 duct research on inertia in firms inside hot spots. Proposed measures
 of inertia (Gresov, Haveman, & Oliva, 1993) may prove useful in this
 case.
 The third and final avenue of research is in response to some of
 the difficulties inherent in studying hot spots. Such difficulties include
 determining mental models of strategists, agglomeration economies, and
 institutional forces over time. A promising approach might include multi-
 ple parallel case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1984), which incorporate
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 longitudinal data collection for different hot spots as they move through
 phases at different paces. Through multiple case studies, researchers
 would use the same protocol for collecting data and assessing patterns
 over time within each industry unit of analysis (Yin, 1984). The result of
 such studies may provide useful information for managers and policy
 makers.
 Policy Implications
 Once a super nova for state-of-the-art innovation, the hot spot quickly
 becomes an industry black hole. The absorbing irony is that some of the
 factors drawing firms to hot spots are the same factors that ultimately
 cause their demise. Because of their potential growth in numbers, hot
 spots are likely to become increasingly important policy issues. At the
 heart of these issues, policy makers will seek prescriptive strategies that
 attempt to reduce the susceptibility of hot spots and prevent dysfunctional
 responses to environmental jolts. Whereas the framework developed here
 does not prescribe policies, it does offer policy makers a view of the
 evolutionary process and its consequences.
 The central question in this context is whether policy intervention can
 avert economic losses and return firms to high levels of innovative activity
 following an environmental jolt. Future research efforts guided by the
 conceptual framework and directed toward specific policy makers' inter-
 ests may prove useful here. Among these interests, policy makers may
 want to understand the processes that contribute to dysfunctional patterns
 of innovation. Researchers could help by identifying factors that enable
 some firms to sidestep dysfunctional institutional pressures in the hot
 spot, such as participating in trade associations and making strategic
 alliances with firms outside of the hot spot. Policy makers might then be
 able to provide incentives that encourage firms to form external alliances.
 When researchers identify regions as hot spots, policy makers may be
 motivated to mitigate potential economic devastation by developing poli-
 cies that attract new industries to the region. Implicit in our propositions
 concerning the reorientation phase, policy intervention can do little to
 restore competitive innovation for hot spots following a jolt. However,
 research based on a theory of hot spots may assist policy makers in
 developing informed regional economic policy.
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